Sunday, August 21, 2011

Reconsidering Privatization in Cross-Border Engagements: The Sometimes Public Nature of Private Activity

Article:


Higher Education Policy (2011) 24, 255–273. doi:10.1057/hep.2011.2

Reconsidering Privatization in Cross-Border Engagements: The Sometimes Public Nature of Private Activity

Jason E Lanea and Kevin Kinsera
aUniversity at Albany, State University of New York, Institute for Global Education Policy Studies, 1400 Washington Avenue, ALBANY, NY 12222, USA
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Abstract

Privatization trends in higher education have typically been analyzed from the perspective of the institution and its relationship with the sponsoring state. The recent phenomenon of international cross-border higher education, however, represents a more complicated picture of privatization. Geographic separation from the sponsoring state is an extraordinary from of privatization in the public sector. At the same time, host countries may look to the international branch campus to achieve public ends. This paper examines the concept of privatization through cross-border educational initiatives, and argues that the public and private nature of cross-border higher education can only be fully understood when considering the relationship with the home and host countries. The analysis is based on comparisons of how governments in Qatar and the Malaysian state of Sarawak use foreign education providers to support government goals, and how those seemingly public purposes problematize traditional concepts of privatization.

Keywords: 

privatization; cross-border education; Qatar; Malaysia; foreign education providers
Privatization pervades discussions about higher education around the globe. Whether because of an inability of the state to fully meet the demand for higher education, or a retrenching of government support for public sector institutions, few countries have avoided the expansion of a private sector (Kinser et al., 2010) or have discouraged the diversification of revenue streams in the public sector (Johnstone and Marucci, 2010). This privatization trend largely has been analyzed from the perspective of the institution and its relationship with the sponsoring state (e.g., Morphew and Eckel, 2009). This leads to an understanding of privatization that implies divestment of the state from public higher education, as well as the active embrace of a neoliberal approach to the delivery of education. Looking at educational systems, then, privatization occurs when more private sector and market-based approaches are used, often alongside a corresponding decrease, in the proportion of government spending within the system.
Now, however, there are higher education institutions that operate as multinational enterprises, decoupling off-campus partnerships and branch campuses from the nation that the home campus was initially chartered and funded to serve. This geographic separation from the state can be seen as one of the most extraordinary forms of privatization in the public sector: universities developing into multi-national enterprises pursuing increased revenue and prestige. Moreover, in their overseas guise, institutional operations are often segregated from the state and deemed private activities (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007).
The cross-border phenomenon represents a more complicated picture of privatization, though. Adjusting the analysis from the relationship between the institution and the home government to the relationship between the institution and the host government can demonstrate the sometimes public nature of private activity. In many developing nations, governments are looking to foreign institutions, irrespective of their public or private status at home, to complement the existing state-sponsored institutions in achieving public ends (Lane, forthcoming).
This paper examines the concept of privatization through cross-border educational initiatives, arguing that the public or private nature of cross-border higher education can only be fully understood when considering the relationship with the home and host governments. The paper explores the private nature of cross-border higher education, and contrasts it with the seemingly public purposes of some activities traditionally perceived as aspects of privatization. The analysis is based on comparison of how governments in Qatar and the Malaysian state of Sarawak use foreign education providers to support government goals, and how those seemingly public purposes problematize traditional conceptions of privatization.
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Privatization and Cross-Border Higher Education

In many nations, educational institutions began exporting their academic programs and institutions during a time of rapid privatization. These activities often came to be viewed as part of the larger privatization movement. And, indeed, they mostly were, as institutions were motivated by the prospect of new revenues and additional prestige (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007). These endeavors represented a significant decoupling of the academic enterprise from the home government (Lane and Kinser, 2008), but little attention was given to the possibly public purposes in which these institutions were engaging in some of the host nations where they were operating.
This transnational institutional mobility is facilitated today by an encouraging policy environment that supports private sector involvement in education, with doors opening to non-governmental providers in many countries (Kinser et al., 2010). Led by Australia, Great Britain, and the United States, universities have developed numerous curricular joint ventures with international partners and have established approximately 160 branch campuses in countries representing almost every continent (Barrow et al., 2003; Verbik and Merkley, 2006; C-BERT, 2011, http://www.globalhighered.org).
While the development of cross-border higher education has been facilitated by privatization trends, this paper derives from the understanding that the ‘private’ or ‘public’ nature of an institution or its activities can be viewed as a matter of degree, rather than a simple sector designation (Johnstone, 1999). The scholarly work on privatization of higher education has generally followed two different tracks over the past three decades. The first track focuses on how the private sector has grown significantly to provide increasing educational access to aspiring college students (e.g., Geiger, 1986; Levy, 1986, 1992, 2006; Altbach, 1999). The second theme originally focused on how public institutions are increasingly operating like private institutions (e.g., Donahue, 1989; Goldstein, 1993), although some authors moved to investigating the degree of privatization regardless of sector designation (e.g., Williams, 1996; Johnstone, 1999).
Cross-border engagements by universities have been described as one of the most significant forms of the privatization trend (Gottlieb and Yakir, 1998; McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007; Chapman and Sakamoto, 2010). Privatization of higher education in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States has encouraged entrepreneurial activity among many institutions and led these countries to become the largest exporters of higher education (Becker, 2009; C-BERT, 2011, http://www.globalhighered.org). The private nature of these activities should be clear. Nearly all are intended to be self-supporting through student fees or partner subsidies, and most are designed by the home campus to provide a new revenue stream for the institution (Kinser, 2010;Kinser et al., 2010). In the host country, they are considered non-governmental organizations and often operate under regulations distinct from state-sponsored higher education (Lane, 2010a; Lane, forthcoming, 2011).
A concern with classifying all cross-border activities as private is that the analyses of privatization activities have tended to look only at the relationship between the institution and the home government. By its very nature, however, cross-border higher education involves at least two governments: a home (exporting) government and a host (importing) government (Lane and Kinser, 2008). When viewed from the perspective of the host government, the functions of an international branch campus may be evaluated as more ‘public’ than when viewed from the perspective of the home government. This dual perspective on cross-border privatization is the focus of this article.
Attention has recently been focused on countries seeking to recruit a number of foreign providers to start up branch campuses as part of a government endorsed regional educational hub (e.g., Kinser and Lane, 2010;Knight, 2010). Countries such as Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates have pursued specific policies to encourage branch campuses as a strategy for economic development and as a way for the countries to rapidly develop their capacity for indigenous delivery of tertiary education (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007;Becker, 2009; Lane, forthcoming, 2011). These host governments have actively solicited foreign providers not to replace the public sector, but to augment and extend their functions in the service of public goals. In some cases, funding comes largely from the government or government controlled entities. The branch campuses become part of the educational system and provide significant educational capacity for the local population. In these cases, the public nature of cross-border higher education becomes more evident.
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Conceptual Framework

According to Johnstone (1999), privatization is a matter of degree rather than a definitional state (i.e., public or private). He suggests that the privatization of an institution can be conceived of along five dimensions of publicness/privateness. This study adapts the Johnstone framework to acknowledge key facets of cross-border higher education that are important for understanding the publicness/privateness of such activities. The framework is adjusted to analyze the relationship between the institution from the perspectives of the respective home and host governments. The conceptual framework, as adapted, includes five dimensions: (1) Mission; (2) Ownership; (3) Investment; (4) Revenue; and (5) Regulation. Each dimension allows for the assessment of the publicness/privateness of the institution's fiscal, fiduciary, and patronage aspects. Each dimension includes four general descriptions, detailed in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The descriptions range from complete ‘publicness’ to complete ‘privateness’, with middle descriptions representing more public than private and more private than public.





The conceptual framework used here reorients some of Johnstone's dimensional descriptions, which were originally based on assumptions derived from domestic provision of education in the United States. The dimensions were newly delimited and descriptions were reoriented to allow for the types of government involvement that may occur in multiple nations, not just the United States. Additionally, a new category entitled, ‘investment’ was included to account for the start-up nature of many cross-border arrangements. This is particularly important when dealing with the creation of an international branch campus that requires significant up-front investment in facilities and labour costs and for which an investor may expect a return on investment. Revenue, a category included in the original framework, represents the sources from which the activity derives new financial resources each year. Finally, Johnstone's category, ‘norms of management behaviour,’ was not included in this study's conceptual framework. The focus of the study is on the relationship between an institution and a government. Although it may be influenced by a government, managerial norms are not core to understanding the nature of the governmental relationships.
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Case Selection and Methods

In order to more systematically investigate the private and public aspects of cross-border higher education, two country case studies were selected for comparative analysis. Qatar and the Malaysian state of Sarawak were chosen because cross-border higher education was previously identified in each nation as a means for achieving broad public policy goals (Lee, 1999; McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007; Lane, 2010a). However, not all cross-border higher education serves public goals. While a counterfactual case is not included, some cross border higher education has developed for more private or pecuniary reasons, most obviously among legally for-profit institutions (Kinser, 2010). Malaysia and Qatar provide the opportunity to examine an important phenomenon in cross-border higher education that to date has been absent in the scholarly and policy discourse.
The data for this study were collected as part of a larger study focusing on the global development of international branch campuses. Site visits were conducted of more than 40 international branch campuses in 10 countries, as well as several corresponding home campuses in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Several weeks were spent in Malaysia and Qatar. A variety of ethnographic and participant-observer techniques were used to study the campuses and their country context, including elite interviews (Dexter, 1970) with administrators, foundation, and government officials. In addition, document analysis (Prior, 1998; Watson, 1998) of government policy papers, media reports, institutional reports and files, and other documents from non-governmental organizations provided additional insights into formalized and public statements about the cross-border initiatives.
A small-n comparative case study approach was used to identify the trends in the development of international branch campuses (Gerring, 2007). The private and public components of cross-border higher education in each country were analyzed for each case separately. In each case, a two-stage analysis was used. First, each case was analyzed using the conceptual framework present above. Second, a comparative assessment was made to determine which trends were evident in both cases or that were case specific.

Sarawak, Malaysia

Malaysia is well documented as an importer of higher education (Lee, 1999; McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007; Lane, 2010a). As a federal system, with education controlled at the national level, at least six international branch campuses in several states have been approved by the Minster of Education to offer degrees. The case of the state of Sarawak, in Malaysian Borneo, demonstrates a particular instance of a state government using a cross-border initiative to further a public agenda.
Private tertiary education has existed in Malaysia since at least the 1980s (Tan, 2002), but institutions were not allowed to award degrees nor could foreign institutions open branches. As a consequence, numerous twinning arrangements between private institutions and foreign providers developed, where students attended the first years of their programme of study in Malaysia, before transferring abroad to complete the degree (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007). This allowed private institutions to promote degree attainment, and gave foreign institutions access to the Malaysian market.
A booming economy in the early 1990s saw enormous growth in twinning programs. The Private Higher Educational Act was passed in 1996 providing a more robust regulatory framework under which the private sector could develop (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2007). The Act encouraged the development of a local private higher education sector to handle growing demand for education and to create more local opportunities for students to earn high quality credentials. A significant dimension of this effort was establishing a process by which private institutions could gain Ministry approval to offer degrees, as well as the opportunity for foreign institutions to operate branch campuses in the country. The Act specified that foreign universities were to fall under national private higher education regulations, essentially treating them no differently than domestic private sector institutions and anticipating they would serve the same public interest in expanding educational access.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis tested the new policy regime (Lee, 1999). It became exceedingly expensive to send students abroad for education. At the same time, government funding of the public sector declined (Ziguras, 2003). Several private institutions were invited by the Minister of Education to rise to university (i.e., degree-granting) status as a way of meeting the educational needs of the population. By 2000, six private universities were operating, all of them in peninsular Malaysia. During this same period, several foreign universities were recruited to establish branch campuses in the country. Two of them, Nottingham University (UK) and Monash University (Australia), established branches in peninsular Malaysia, in the capital of Kuala Lumpur. A third, Curtin University of Technology (Australia), unlike the other institutions under the Act, located its branch in Miri, Sarawak, a town in Malaysian Borneo. Thus, just 4 years after the passage of the law authorizing private university degrees, nine institutions were established, a third of which were international branches. For a country with just 15 state-sponsored universities at the time, this represented a substantial increase in educational capacity.
The unique placement of Curtin in Sarawak reflected the fact that the efforts to increase educational capacity were focused on peninsular Malaysia. This branch represented a concerted effort by local and Sarawak government officials to bring a university to their area. The process began in the early 1990s, when officials set a strategic goal of raising the profile of Miri, Sarawak's second largest population center, and achieve city status in Malaysia. A central requirement set by the federal government for cities was the presence of a university. In 1994, however, the federal government located the new University of Malaysia-Sarawak in the state capital of Kuching, severely limiting the chances that Miri would ever be home to a state university. The arrival of the Asian financial crisis made it even more unlikely the government would expand the university to Miri. Moreover, Sarawak is the largest Malaysian state, with limited transportation infrastructure, and the 800km distance between Miri and Kuching was prohibitive for local students.
The option of a state university closed to them, officials in Miri (and the nearby town of Sibu) took advantage of the recently passed private higher education act and attempted to recruit a domestic private university, but received no offers (Sheehy, 2009). With limited alternatives, they turned to an overseas institution to establish a branch campus. The selection of Curtin was based on the personal experience of a local land developer whose children had graduated from the Australian university. The story of his initial trip to Perth to meet — unannounced — the Curtin Vice-Chancellor in 1998 is part of the institutional lore (Sheehy, 2009). Within weeks, the proposal was formalized and the Sarawak state government made commitments of land and capital to finance the project.
The facilitation of local and state officials sped the approval process through the federal government. Even though Nottingham and Monash were invited by the Malaysian Minister of Education to establish branches before Curtin was approached by Miri and Sarawak officials, the Curtin branch opened first, less than a year after that propitious visit to Perth, and it became the first international branch in Malaysia to receive approval to award degrees.
As important as the political support was, the financial support from the local and state governments was just as significant. The funding was cycled through a state-controlled company that provided the land and built the infrastructure for the new venture, and reimbursed Curtin's home campus for expenses related to curriculum development and quality assurance (Sheehy, 2009). Curtin's only obligation was to hire staff and decide within 3 years whether to take a 20% equity stake in the company. Since Curtin's involvement was predicated on profitability within 3 years, the time line for the investment was to the advantage of the home campus.
Academically, all decisions about programs and curriculum remained with the home campus in Perth. Yet, the local government was quite influential in determining the scale and scope of the effort in Miri. They insisted that the branch be a full-fledged degree granting university, and resisted suggestions from Curtin faculty and administrators that it begin slowly under a twinning model. Indeed, the government set a prerequisite that at least 4 full years of education toward chemical and electrical engineering and computer science degrees would be provided at the branch. Moreover, a research agenda was defined from the beginning by an explicit government expectation that scholarship would be directed toward six areas deemed important for local and regional development (Sheehy, 2009).
The success of the Curtin Branch in Miri shows 10 years after its founding. Miri city officials achieved their goal of establishing a top university and rising themselves to city status. A recent ranking of all universities, public and private, in Malaysia (Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE), 2009) places Curtin's branch in the first tier of higher education institutions. This is ahead of the state campus of the University of Malaysia Sarawak in Kuching, which was placed in the second tier, and the only first tier university in Malaysian Borneo.

Qatar

Qatar is one of the most active importers of foreign education providers in the world (Becker, 2009; C-BERT, 2011, http://www.globalhighered.org). Currently, there are nine international branch campuses operating in the country. Six of those institutions are from the United States, two from Canada, and one from the Netherlands. The prominence of these institutions becomes more apparent when compared to the existence of only one public university, the University of Qatar (Stasz et al., 2007). The objective of the Qatar ruling family has been to utilize institutions from other nations to help build the educational, cultural, and economic capacity of this young nation.
Qatar is a small country (both in terms of geography and population) that has been using the wealth generated from expansive natural gas reserves to bolster its international reputation (Peterson, 2006). The peninsular nation extends from Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf. The population of the country is about 1.7 million, although only 300,000 are considered citizens of the state. Since independence the country has been run by the Al-Thani family. The current ruler took over from his father in 1995 and since that time has worked to stabilize the government and extend the global reach of the nation (Peterson, 2006). Since his ascension to power, the Sheikh and his wife have led efforts to grow the social and cultural freedoms in the country. While still an autocracy that abides by Sharia law, the nation has developed an aggressive news agency, Al Jazeera, and, through the Doha Debates, allowed for critical discussions of controversial topics.
The Sheikh also recognized that the long-term success of the nation requires an educated citizenry. For most of its history, postsecondary education was available only through the University of Qatar or studying abroad (Stasz et al., 2007). The University of Qatar is the first and only public university in the country, at least in the traditional sense (Moini et al., 2009). The university was established in 1977, building upon a foundation laid by the creation of a College of Education in 1973, shortly after the nation achieved independence. The University now has seven colleges, offering degree programs in education, humanities and social sciences, science, Islamic law, engineering, administrative science and economics, and technology. Enrolments in the University have long been dominated by female students; professions such as education are perceived as primarily female professions and many of the male students choose to study in other countries. While the University has been the core component of the nation's higher education sector, it has not been viewed as the only means for increasing the educational opportunities available to students nor as a vehicle for raising the international prestige of the nation's higher education sector.
In 1995, the Qatar Foundation was created by a decree of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar to pursue a threefold mission of ‘… education, scientific research and community development, … (to help) build a sustainable society where the sharing and creation of knowledge will enhance quality of life for all’ (Qatar Foundation, 2010). The Foundation Board is chaired by Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, the wife of the Sheikh. While operating outside of the normal routines of government, the Foundation is a public entity, pursuing a public mission, and led by a member of the ruling family. For the purposes of this analysis, it is viewed as an agent of the Qatari state.
One of the more significant projects of the Foundation has been the creation of Education City. Education City comprises well-regarded academic programs from six American institutions. Unlike nearby Dubai that has allowed a large number of foreign education providers to offer competing programs (Lane, 2010b), Qatar has been more explicit in ‘recruiting programs that complement the needs of the nation and do not compete with each other’, according to a representative from the Qatar Foundation. The oldest of the branch campuses, Virginia Commonwealth University, founded in 1998, offers degrees in fashion design, graphic design, and interior design among others. Weill Cornell Medical College, which started in 2001, provides the only medical education in the country. Texas A&M offers programs in chemical, electrical, and petroleum engineering. Business and computer science degrees are offered by Carnegie Mellon University and Georgetown prepares students for foreign service careers. Finally, Northwestern University began offering programs in journalism and communications in 2008.
There is clear evidence of the public commitment to the Education City development. Education city, including the buildings in which the branch campuses operate, was funded by the Qatar Foundation. Such large expenditures are explained as a commitment to ‘providing its citizens and the citizens of the region with world-class university facilities now and for the future’ (Qatar Foundation, 2010). A Qatar Foundation official agreed: ‘In part, the Qatar Foundation is committed to bring world-class educational opportunities to our students, particularly those for whom studying abroad is not an option’. In fact, the expenses of all Qatari students and many non-Qatari students in Education City are funded by the Qatar government or the Qatar Foundation through a web of scholarship and loan programs (Stasz et al., 2007). And, although the institutions are not regulated directly by the Supreme Education Council, the government agency responsible for education, oversight of the operations of the institutions is conducted by Qatar Foundation officials.
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Case Analysis

The cases of Qatar and Sarawak, Malaysia highlight the complex privatization role of cross-border higher education. The conceptual framework is used to categorize the privatization of branches along five dimensions of mission, ownership, investment, revenue, and regulation. Each case is alternately viewed from the perspective of the home government and the host government. The cases, although not comprehensive representations of the variety of possible cross-border arrangements, do illustrate the challenge in labelling all cross-border activity solely as examples of privatization.

Mission

Mission relates to the purpose of the branch campus and the role it serves within society. In both cases, the branch campus activities fall outside of the public purposes of the institution as expected by the home government. Indeed, as viewed from the relationship with the home government, the Australian campuses in Malaysia and the American campuses in Qatar are serving the ‘private interests of students, clients and owners’ (See Table 1). While the activities are not forbidden by the home government, neither are they considered core to the institutions’ public missions.
Both in the United States and Australia, government policies dictate that instructional activities of public institutions that occur outside of the country are not state functions (Lane et al., 2009; Lane, 2010a). In Qatar, however, the branch campuses are expected to fulfil an expressly public mission to serve the needs of Qatar. As stated by a representative of the Qatar Foundation, ‘(the six American) institutions were selected because of their international reputations and their ability to bring programs considered core to improving Qatar's economy. For example, Texas A&M's engineering programs support our petroleum industry, Carnegie Mellon's business programs align with our interest in being a financial hub, and the inclusion of Northwestern's journalism programme is meant to help grow our media interests’. This public focus is corroborated by branch campus deans interviewed for this study. The dean of a private institution noted that the Qatar branch mission was more public than that of the home campus. In contrast to the main campus in the United States, ‘(community service) is part of the expectation of our being here — to help build the local industry’. This division between public and private missions is not as evident for all campuses, but the purposes of the branch campuses are more publically oriented when viewed from the perspective of the Qatari government than from that of American state governments.
Sarawak has a more mixed purpose for its cross-border initiative. While not as clearly public as the Qatar examples, the Sarawak branch engages in both public and private purposes. The campus supports economic development through providing research and instruction related to the industrial interests in the oil producing region, and several corporate sponsorships of students through scholarships suggests a locally private role. But the state interest is also evident. The public purposes driving the government's engagement dominated the development of the project by defining baseline programme terms. A report from the Australian Universities Quality Agency (2009), states, ‘The Sarawak State Government is satisfied with the working relationship and contribution being made by Curtin, and sees it producing graduates whose skills are aligned with the strategic intent and plan of the State’ (p. 37).

Ownership

Ownership refers to the authority that controls institutional activity and is often a mix of governmental and institutional authority (Duryea, 2000). In many studies of privatization, ownership is the key determinate for analyzing the private or public nature of an institution (e.g., Levy, 2006; Kinser, 2007). In most cases, ownership of a domestic institution can be easily identified as being government controlled (i.e., public) or owned by a private corporate entity. However, in cross-border higher education, activities can often be joint ventures between government entities, the home institution, and private partners (Lane, 2010a) and cross-border activities are pursued by both publicly and privately chartered institutions (Kinser et al., 2010). Such arrangements make this a difficult dimension to assess.
In Qatar, there is joint ownership between the Foundation and the institution. While the institution retains absolute control over the academic aspects of the enterprise, the Foundation owns the campus facilities and controls, which institutions operate and, which programs are offered. On the other hand, the branch operates as a private non-profit when approached from the perspective of the home country. It is controlled by the institution, which can always decide to walk away if the on-the-ground activities are incompatible with the expectations of stakeholders at home.
Sarawak reflects a similar joint control model, where both the state and the institution are linked in managing the branch effort. In this case, there is an actual legal entity that has been formed to manage the branch with (due to Malaysian regulations regarding foreign ownership) 49% of the stock held by Curtin and 51% held by its Miri and Sarawak partners. Dissolving the branch could technically be accomplished by the majority stake, but in practice both hold the balance of responsibility. Particularly during development of the branch, the ‘Miri Working Party’ was a representative body that guided the operation of the Sarawak branch, including approval of courses and first year academic plans. A ‘Joint Venture Board’ met regularly, chaired in alternating fashion by a Curtin representative and a Malaysian partner, to discuss issues arising during the first 6 months of campus operation (Sheehy, 2009). Like the Qatar case, the Sarawak branch at home is primarily a private nonprofit effort. However, the specific financial model expected excess revenue to be generated, and Curtin accepted the option to acquire a stake in the financial success of the branch (Australian Universities Quality Agency, 2009). Thus, elements of a for-profit ownership model can be seen in this case.

Investment

The investment in the branch refers to initial start-up capital required for the branch to begin operations. The importance of this category rests on the fact that the branch campuses in this study are all less than 15-years old and the original investors still have interests in the campus. Further, the investment component demonstrates the relative commitment of the host and home governments. Financial commitment from the home government is mostly prohibited, although there is assuredly spillover from such things as brand recognition and administrative support funded by the home government. From the perspective of the home government, then, the investment component is entirely private, even if those funds come from another government. In contrast, the host governments of Malaysia and Qatar both invested almost all of the start-up costs for the branch campuses.
The development of Qatar's Education City, including the buildings for each institution and the shared student affairs spaces such athletic fields and the student center, was entirely financed by the Qatar Foundation. In addition each institution was provided with monies to cover their initial operational costs. All of the interviewed deans commented that their budgets are funded by the Qatar Foundation and not the home campus; and the campus student affairs administrators that were part of this study indicated that many of their expenses are paid for by the Qatar Foundation. In fact, it seems there is more public support for student affairs activities in Qatar than in the United States. As one participant from a public university said, ‘At home, activities like residence halls and many student activities are expected to generate their own revenue; here even the costs that are generally considered private (at home) are covered by the Qatar Foundation’.
The Sarawak case is similar to Qatar in that virtually all investment in the branch comes from public sources, or those controlled by the state (Australian Universities Quality Agency, 2009). The fact that the branch could be started almost exclusively through external investments was considered one of the compelling rationales and necessary preconditions for the home campus to endorse a branch in Malaysia. At the same time, much conversation on the home campus centered on reputational questions and whether the branch was sustainable under the leadership of Curtin personnel. In particular, the Curtin Council, on the main campus, sought specific assurances that the Curtin name would be protected if the University decided to withdraw from the project (Sheehy, 2009). Compared to the US institutions in Qatar, the public commitment in Australia was somewhat greater, given a Statute had to be passed to legally allow offshore operations before the project could move forward. Still, from a financial perspective, no public investment in the branch was offered nor was required to establish and continue the initiative in Malaysia.

Revenue

The revenue describes the source of income for the branch. Ongoing operations of each campus depend upon a continuous flow of financial resources. The sources from which this revenue is derived can affect the public or private nature of the institution (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). If revenue is provided by a government entity, the campus is more likely to pursue public goals. Whereas if revenue is generated from students or other private actors, the institution is more likely to engage in more market oriented activities commonly associated with privatization (Williams, 1996). Again, for both cases, the home governments forbid the use of state funds; by definition, the branch campus revenue is derived from entirely private sources. Within Qatar and Malaysia, revenue is generated primarily through a tuition-based system. However, in Qatar, the tuition is primarily paid by the government, while in Malaysia the students pay the fees. As such, when viewed from the perspective of the host government, the revenue generation in Qatar is almost entirely from public sources, while the revenue generation in Malaysia still has a strong private component.
In Qatar, the government, through the Higher Education Institute Scholarships covers almost all the educational costs of citizens, including those attending the branch campuses at Education City (Stasz et al., 2007). In addition, there are extensive loan and scholarship programs available for non-Qatari students that want to attend one of the branch campuses. Moreover, the Qatar Foundation has provided their own forms of financial support ranging from work-study programs to the Hamdan Bin Khalifa Financial Aid Programme, which provides support for academically qualified, but financially needy students that want to attend one of the institutions in Education City. In sum, even though much of the revenue is derived from tuition calculations, most of the annual revenue for the branch campuses comes from public entities in Qatar.
The Sarawak case shows a more standard private sector model, with revenue being generated primarily through student tuition along with the assistance of a federal financial aid system (i.e., Higher Education Student Loans provided by the Higher Education Student Loan Corporation) and locally generated scholarships. But the primary responsibility for paying rests with students and their families. Additional support from Sarawak and Miri comes through an intellectual license fee based on 8% of the total revenue of the branch (Sheehy, 2009). Because of the Sarawak branch's research mission, revenue is also generated through research grants to the Miri campus, which may include grants from public sources in Australia (Australian Universities Quality Agency, 2009). Nevertheless, the branch revenue model does not presume public support from the home campus or government, and any public resources are supportive of research rather than the primary undergraduate mission.

Regulation

This dimension assesses the extent to which the branch campuses are regulated as ‘public’ or ‘private’ entities. Similar to most other dimensions, the perspective of the home campus is that these institutions are private entities and largely regulated in that way. The significant difference is that there are provisions from the home government that are designed to limit any negative impact on the home campus. In both the Australia and the United States, the government recognizes the existence of the branch campuses and has some regulations, particularly in quality assurance, that pertain to such activities. As such, the home government relationship is deemed more private than public, although not entirely private.
The regulatory framework designed in Qatar evidences extensive control by the government over the branch campus institutions, although the government regulation is less than that of Qatar University (Moini et al., 2009). Branch campuses in Qatar's Education City are invited into the country by the government and can only offer those programs officially allowed by the government. Moreover, there are occasional quality assurance assessments in which the Qatar Foundation engages to ensure the programs offered in Education City are comparable to those on the home campus and to ensure the students are receiving a quality educational experience.
Regulation also assigns the responsibility for quality assurance and effective operation of the branch. The Qatar Foundation takes this role for Education City branches, serving as the ultimate judge of acceptable educational practice. Regulation at home is achieved through accreditation standards supervised by non-governmental agencies. This is subject to institutional decisions about mission and purpose for the branch, with the primary stipulation being that quality abroad needs to be essentially the same as quality at home (Kinser et al., 2010).
The Curtin branch in Sarawak is regulated as a private sector university. As such, it is subject to clear authority of the federal Ministry. For example, the state insisted that the name of the branch must be ‘Curtin University of Technology — Miri Campus’ not Curtin International College as the institution proposed. Documentation required by the Ministry of Education included course-related content and details about facilities, as well as individual approval of every faculty member (Sheehy, 2009). The branch is, however, less regulated than a public sector institution would be, with, according to the 1996 authorizing Act, more freedom regarding admissions and language of instruction. At home, in Australia, regulations proceed both under a government-sponsored quality assurance regime, as well as with an approval process that requires explicit government approval for the branch. So, although there is more power given to the state in Australia, off-shore activities are expected to be conducted with significant autonomy given to the home campus.
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Understanding the Public Nature of Privatization in Cross-Border Higher Education

The somewhat simultaneously development of cross-border and privatization activities in higher education has led to an unchallenged confounding of the two phenomena. While some cross-border activities are forms of privatization, carte blanche acceptance that all cross-border activities are of a private nature fails to account for the dualistic relationship that exists between the institution and the home and host governments. Indeed, the development of cross-border higher education activities challenges traditional assumptions of privatization based entirely on the relationship between the institution and its home, or sponsoring, government. Yet, by their very nature, cross-border activities require entanglement with at least two governments. Thus, to fully understand the public-private nature of cross-border engagements requires a dual analysis that looks at the relationship between the institution and both the home and host governments.
Applying a five-dimensional conceptual framework to data gathered from fieldwork in Qatar and Sarawak, Malaysia, this article evidences that activities interpreted as private in nature from the perspective of the home government can be interpreted as public from the perspective of the host government. In fact, the Qatar case shows that it is possible for an international branch campus to engage in more public purposes abroad than it does at its main campus at home. These findings challenge conventional wisdom that such activities do not fulfil public purposes and demonstrate that the conceptualization of privatization in multinational activities must take into account local government expectations of public purpose.
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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Christine Farrugia in the preparation of this manuscript.



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Malabe Medical College given degree status

The Nation, 21/08/2011,
By S. Selvakumar
The University Grants Commission (UGC) will grant degree awarding status to the Malabe Private Medical College established two years ago. When this status is granted it will be the first private university in Sri Lanka to award the MBBS degree.
When contacted by The Nation Secretary to the Ministry of Higher Education Dr. Sunil Jayantha Navaratne said that when the private medical college affiliated to a Russian University sought permission from the UGC to award the MBBS degree it sent a team of officials to Malabe to inspect all aspects there and following a positive report from the officials it was agreed to grant the private medical institution’s request.
Asked whether the Sri Lanka Medical Council (SLMC) would accept the MBBS of a private institution Dr. Navaratne said the SLMC is a professional body and it is up to them to recognize the degree or not.
However since the UGC has now agreed to grant the MBBS degree awarding status to the Malabe Private Medical College it is likely that the SLMC would recognize the degree and permit the undergraduates to undergo clinical training in government hospitals. At present these medical graduates do their clinical training in private hospitals.
There are about 200 students studying in this private medical institution affiliated to the Russian university and it was estimated that each student is charged around Rs 6 million for the course.

Saturday, August 13, 2011

New Council To Regulate Private Educational Institutions

Daily Mirror, 13/08/2011, By Lakna Paranamanna
The Higher Education Ministry yesterday announced plans for establishing a ‘Non-state Higher Education Council’ – an institution to regulate the non-state higher educational institutions -- in a move to curb operations of bogus educational establishments.
Ministry’s Additional Secretary P.G. Jayasinghe said the decision to establish a regulatory body was taken following the increasing number of complaints received by the ministry about bogus non-state educational institutions.
Mr. Jayasinghe said an organization to regulate the standards of study programmes offered in the non-state educational institutions – the ‘Sri Lanka qualifications framework, accreditation and quality assurance board’, would also be introduced to make sure that students obtain the best qualifications.
“We often receive complaints from students and parents about rackets swindling them of their money in the guise of education establishments. The students pay exorbitant amounts of money and follow courses which they later realized were not recognized. Therefore, we have noted the importance of regulating quality and accreditation as well as streamlining the registrations of non-state higher education institutions and the study courses they offer,” he added.
Mr. Jayasinghe said it would be made compulsory for every non-state higher education establishment to register with the ‘Non-state higher education council’ and adhere to the standards set by the ‘Sri Lanka qualifications framework, accreditation and quality assurance board’.
“We will constantly monitor the standards of each institution and if it declines, their accreditation will be withdrawn,” he added.
Mr. Jayasinghe said cabinet approval had been granted for the establishment of the institution and the Bill when drafted would be presented in parliament.

Forced to leave, says Prof. Hoole

The Hindu, 11/08/2011, By R. K. RADHAKRISHNAN

Professor Ratnajeevan Hoole, a respected Sri Lankan Tamil academician and a prominent returnee after the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers, said on Thursday that he was forced to leave the country.
“Yes, I left through Colombo airport for London before [sic] I am arrested. I will work in the U.S. till lawyers can sort this out for me,” he told The Hindu via e-mail, when asked if he had fled Sri Lanka. “I will return because Sri Lanka [Jaffna in particular] is my home,” he asserted.
Prof. Hoole, one of the few Tamils who was vocal in his criticism of the Tamil Tigers when the outfit ruled the Northern Province had had to flee Sri Lanka then. This time he had to leave because of his differences with the lone Tamil Minister in Sri Lankan Cabinet, Douglas Devananda. Mr. Devananda had filed a defamation case against Prof. Hoole in the Kayts court over articles that the academician had written in the media, which were highly critical of Mr. Devananda's role in the North, and the ruling UPFA in general.
“My story is in the last three [editions of] the Sunday Leader. In the first of three articles, I saw what was going on during the Local Government elections [July 23] and reported it. That has upset Douglas [Devananda] in whose hands the government has… placed the full govt. apparatus, especially in Kayts [island],” he said in an e-mail communication. “The next Court date is the [August] 15th [fortunately for me, because this week is court vacation]. I was advised to be out of the island by then — not only by my lawyers but by all my friends in Jaffna,” he added.
Prof. Hoole had come back to Sri Lanka to help rebuild systems in the island after the conclusion of the war. “When he [The President] invited displaced expatriates to return, Prof. Carlo Fonseka approached him and he promised to have me and my wife reinstated as a professor if I was here. Although he issued the order when I came, it has not been implemented. My wife has been unemployed for a year. I was on an appointment until further notice,” he said when asked to clarify on him coming back to Sri Lanka.
Earlier, in 2006, Prof. Hoole, an engineering professor, was the Jaffna University Vice Chancellor. Because of his outspoken ways, the LTTE did not allow him to function and he went back to the United States.
VC panel
After he came back following the defeat of the LTTE, he was in the panel of three candidates for the Vice Chancellor post, but medical faculty Professor Vasanthi Arasaratnam, was appointed to the post. “I applied for VC [post] by the appointed process. At that time when I was elected by the Council to the list of 3 from which the President selects one, various people have recommended me for appointment. That is the only time I have had to deal with him or communicate with him. In December at the only one-to-one meeting during the VC appointment process, he promised to appoint me at a personal meeting,” Prof. Hoole said.
Ever since he returned, Prof. Hoole has also been critical of the government's approach to the ethnic issue and has spoke in many fora. “True nation building is about celebrating our differences without suppressing them and addressing grievances. I am afraid that the government is missing the point in its ever effervescent and exuberant pronouncements about unity,” he told an audience at the Naro Udeshi Lecture at the Mahatma Gandhi Centre recently, his last lecture in Colombo.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Prof. Ratnajeevan Hoole facing ‘jail without bail’ situation leaves Sri Lanka



Professor S. Ratnajeevan. H. Hoole
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Professor S.Ratnajeevan.H.Hoole, UGC Coordinator for Engineering, University of Jaffna,has flown out of Sri Lanka to a Country in the west.
Prof.Hoole has left Sri Lanka against the backdrop of “legal action “initiated against him by cabinet minister Kathiravelu “Douglas” Devananda.
Douglas Devananda, secretary-general of Eelam Peoples Democratic Party(EPDP) is regarded as the most powerful Tamil politician in the North.

Devananda’s power&influence extends far beyond the portfolio of Traditional Industries held by him in President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s cabinet.
For instance,It is alleged that several senior govt officials, Jaffna varsity academics & judicial officers are controlled by Douglas Devananda.
AGA divisions of Delft,Kayts&velanai within the Kayts electoral division in Jaffna district are considered to be strongholds of the EPDP.
When local authority elections were held in the north on July 23rd 2011 the EPDP was able to win in only these three Pradeshiya Sabhas.
Prof.Hoole visited areas in the Kayts electoral division on election day & discovered many excesses & violations of election laws taking place.
He wrote an article“Pitfalls in the President’s Alliance with the EPDP–A Visit to Kayts on Elections Day”based on his first-hand experience.
EPDP news website of July 29th said Kayts Police had questioned Prof.Hoole concerning a defamatory article written by him about Devananda.
EPDP news website of Aug 1st said Prof.Hoole had agreed to come to the Kayts police station on July 31st but had not come after telephoning.
Prof.Hoole issued a statement refuting the news items in the EPDP news website. He said the Kayts Police had not contacted him as mentioned.
Subsequently Prof.Hoole was contacted&Inspector Silva & Sgt.Nandakumaran of Kayts Police recorded his statement in Jaffna on August 2nd.
Prof.Hoole in his statement responded to six charges made by minister Devananda in his complaint to Kayts Police about the article at issue.
Prof.Hoole said in a statement that minister Devananda by pursuing legal action was attempting to scare him&stop criticism of the EPDP chief.
On August 4th a Policeman went to Prof.Hoole’s office with a “summons” requiring him to be present at the Kayts courts on August 5th at 9am.
Nature of the summons indicated that Prof.Hoole would face a criminal charge & that he may be remanded in custody unless otherwise given bail.
It was also feared that the reason for a complaint being filed in Kayts instead of Jaffna was aimed at “jail without bail” for Prof. Hoole.
It was alleged magistrates have not found it easy at times to control the large numbers of EPDP cadres usually present in Kayts courts.
Since the hastily issued summons gave him little time for making adequate preparation,Prof.Hoole decided to seek a later date from courts.
He found several lawyers refusing to appear in the Kayts courts because of the influence allegedly enjoyed by the EPDP in the Kayts area.
Some lawyers were apprehensive about appearing at the Kayts courts in a case antagonistic to Devananda as they feared deadly repercussions.
Finally a lawyer instructed by senior attorney&ex-Jaffna TNA MP -N.Sri Kantha- represented Prof.Hoole at Kayts courts& sought a later date.
Prof.Hoole’s absence was deemed as contempt of court by the Kayts magistrate who issued a warrant against him on that count.
A warning was issued that an open warrant for Prof.Hoole’s arrest would be issued if he failed to be present in court on August 15th.
It is in this potential “jail without bail” situation that Prof.Hoole has left Sri Lanka.When he will return to Sri Lanka is the key question.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Foreign University Bill in House soon

Daily News 10/08/2011


The much anticipated, Foreign University Bill would be presented to Parliament within the next two months after going through the Legal Draftsman. 

Cabinet has sanctioned the Bill and it has been sent to the Legal Draftsman, Higher Education Ministry Secretary Dr. Sunil Jayantha Navaratne told the Daily News. "Legal drafts and translation of the Bill are currently under preparation and would be shortly presented to Parliament", he said. 

The new Bill which regulates and monitors foreign universities has been titled "Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Qualification Framework Bill". 

He further said that up to now the ministry has received applications from 10 universities expressing their interest to set up foreign universities in Sri Lanka. 

Universities from USA, Japan, UK, Russia, China, India and Australia have shown a keen interest in setting up Medical, IT, Engineering and Management Universities in Sri Lanka. 

Several institutions are already under construction and these universities will launch their academic activities once the Bill is passed. 

Those universities are planning to set up universities in areas such as Colombo, Kandy, Jaffna and Puttalam he said. 

Every year, around 10,000 students from Sri Lanka migrate to foreign countries spending over 12 billion. 

The ministry has taken measures to offer local students 20 percent of the slots in those foreign universities.

සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සටනට පසුවදනක්

Sri Lanka Guardian

අමිල ගුණරත්න

වැඩි පඩි ඉල්ලා සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන් මෑතකදී එලියට බැස්සෝය. ඔවුන් එසේ එලියට බැස්සේ සරසවි සිසුන්ට හෝ මෙරටේ ජනතාවට ඇති ආදරයකින් නොවන බව අප දනිමු. ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල පද්ධතිය කඩා වැටී තිබේ. ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවල සිසුන්ට පුස්තකාල , සෞඛ්‍ය , ක්‍රීඩා යනාදී පහසුකම් නොව පෙට්ටි කඩෙන් ලාබෙට ගන්නා ඉටි කොලේ ඔතපු එක ව්‍යංජනයේ නීරස බත් එක කා අත හෝදගන්නට හරි හමන් ටැප් එකක් පවා නැත. එවැනි පහසුකම් සිසුන්ට ඇති කර දීමට සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන් එලියට බැස්සේ නැත. එලියට බැස්සේ තමන්ගේ ආත්මාර්ථකාමී අභිලාෂයන් සඳහාය. 
 
පිටරට විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වල මෙන් ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වල සරසවි ආචාර්යවරු සහ සරසවි සිසුන් අතර දැනුම , අනාගත වෘත්තිය දැනුම වර්ධනය කර ගැනීමේ කතිකා නැත. ඇත්තේ හූව, කැලෑ පත්තර සහ ගුටි ඇන ගැනීමේ සන්නිවේදන කලාවයි. එම නිසා අපේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වලින් ගැඹුරු මිනිසුන් බිහි වෙන්නේ නැත. ලිංගික අසහනය , පන්ති වෛරය සහ හීනමානය යන තුන් කලාව පිරි ඇති ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවලවලට සුදුසුකම් ලැබුවද දැන් ඇති හැකි එවුන් එන්නේ නැත. උන් යන්නේ ඇමරිකාවේ , ඕස්ට්‍රේලියාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවලටය. හීනමානය සහ අසහනය ඇති එවුන් සිත් සේ නවක වධ කියා අමු අමුවේ මිනිසුන්ගේ මුලික අයිතිවාසිකම් උල්ලංඝනය කරති. (මෙවැනි පරිසරයක් විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවල තිබීම ජෙප්පන්ට නම් කල්ල මරේය) ඒවා නැවැත්වීමටවත් සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන්ට දැක්මක් නැත. අන්තිමේදී එයත් භාර ගත්තේ මිලිටරියයි. ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල ලෝක ශ්‍රේණි ගත කිරීම අනුව සාක්ෂරතාවය අඩු අප්‍රිකාවේ රටවල විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වලටත් වඩා පසු පස සිටින නිසා පෞද්ගලික අංශයේ රැකියා පවා ලැබෙන්නේ බටහිරට ගොස් ව්‍යාපාර කළමනාකරණය ඩිප්ලෝමාවක් හෝ ලබාගත් තැනැත්තාටය. අවශේෂයන් ඉසුරුපාය හෝ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල ප්‍රතිපාදන කොමිසම ගොඩනැගිල්ල ඉදිරියට ගොස් පිනට ආණ්ඩුවෙන් රැකියාවක් දෙන තුරු උපවාස කාල යුතුය. ආණ්ඩුව රැකියා විරහිත උපාධිධාරීන් 40,000 රැකියා දුන් නමුත් ඔවුන්ගෙන් රාජ්‍ය කාර්යක්ෂමතාවට වූ පිටුවහලක් නැත. ගිරා දැනුම මිස ප්‍රයෝගික දැනුම බහුතරයකට නැත. මෙය අමිහිරි නමුත් සත්‍ය යථාර්තයයි.

ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවල මෙවැනි පහත් තත්වයකට වැටී ඇති බව එස්. බී පමණක් නොවේ රජතුමාද හොඳින් දනියි. එම නිසා එලදායිතාවක් නොමැති අපගේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල තව අවුරුදු පහක් වසා තැබුවත් එය රටට පාඩුවක් නොවන බව මේ දෙපොල හොඳින්ම දනිති. එම නිසා අවශ්‍ය වුවහොත් විශ්ව විද්‍යාල තව අවුරුදු පහක් වුවද වසා තබන බව එස් .බී පාරම් බෑවේය. වෙනත් රටක ඇමතිවරයෙක් (විශේෂයෙන් උසස් අධ්‍යාපන ඇමතිවරයා ) එසේ කිවේ නම් මුළු විශ්ව විද්‍යාල ප්‍රජාවම විරෝධතාව දැක්වීමට ඉඩ තිබුණි. නමුත් ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවල කෙරෙන්නේ සහ තමන්ද කරන්නේ බොරුව බව සරසවි ආචාර්යවරු දනිති. එම නිසා එස් බී ගේ කතාවට කිසිම විරෝධතාවක් නාවේය.

සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන් තමන්ගේ පර්මිට් වාහනයට දක්වන්න සැලකිල්ලෙන් සහ අවධානයෙන් සියයට එකක් තමන්ගෙන් ඉගෙන ගන්නා සරසවි සිසුවාට යොමු කළේ නම් ලෝක ශ්‍රේණි ගත කිරීම අනුව ලංකාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාල මෙතරම් පහලට වැටෙන්නේ නැත. බොහෝ සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන් තමන්ගේ ළමුන්ව උසස් අධ්‍යාපනය සදහා ඇමරිකාවේ , ඕස්ට්‍රේලියාවේ විශ්ව විද්‍යාලවලට යැවීමට සැලසුම් හදනවා මිස තමන් උගන්වන විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වලට තම දරුවන් ඉගෙන ගැනීමට එනවා දැකීමට අකමැතිය. ඊට හේතුව මෙතන සිදුවන්නේ බොරුව බව හොඳාකාරවම දන්නා බැවිනි.

සරසවි ආචාර්යවරු උගන්වන්නේ පරණ දැනුමය. ඔවුන් අලුතින් යමක් නොකියවති. ටියුෂන් දීමට හා දේශපාලන පක්ෂ වලට කඩේ යාමට තිබෙන නිසා එසේ කියවීමට කාල වේලාවද නැත. තමන්ගේ ගුරා තමුන්ට දුන් නෝට්ස් ටික ගෝලයන්ට දෙති. ගෝලයන්ද ඒවා ගිරවුන් මෙන් කටපාඩම් කර ගනිති පරිගණක යුගයට ගැලපෙන නවීකරණයක් නැත. යමක් අධ්‍යනය කරන්නේ හෝ බුද්ධි කලම්බනයක් ප්‍රොජෙක්ට් එකක් කිරීමට හෝ උත්සහයක් නැත. වෙනත් රටවල විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වල මෙන් තමන් උගන්වන විෂයේ විෂය පාඨමාලා ප්‍රසිද්ධ කරන්නේ නැත. ඒවා රස රහස් ය. ඇතැම් සරසවි ආචාර්යවරු සිසුන් ගේ ප්‍රශ්න පත්‍ර ලකුණු කරන ක්‍රමය අපුරුය. කාමරයේ විදුලි පංකාව උපරිමයට දමා පිළිතුරු පත්‍ර උඩ දමති. මධ්‍යට වැටෙන පිළිතුරු පත්‍ර වලට වැඩි ලකුණුද ඈතට පාවී යන ඒවාට අඩු ලකුණුද ලැබේ. බොහෝ විට පන්ති සාමාර්ථයක් ලැබීමට ආචාර්යවරයා සමග යහන් ගතවිය යුතුය. සමහර කථිකාචාර්යවරු සිසුවියන්ගෙන් ප්‍රසිධියේ ලිංගික අල්ලස් ඉල්ලති. වැඩි පඩි ඉල්ලා මිස විශ්ව විද්‍යාල වල ගුණාත්මකභාවය වර්ධනය කිරීමට සහය වෙයව් කියා සරසවි ආචාර්යවරුන් එලියට බසින්නේ නැත. එසේ ගුණාත්මකබව වැඩි කිරීමට ඔවුන්ට උවමනාවක් ද නැත. අවසානයේදී අයිවෝ ජෙනිග්ස් සහ අයිවෝ ඩෙනිස් අතර වෙනස නොදන්නා බුද්ධිමය අතින් ලාමක ගිරා පෝතකයන් පරපුරක් පමණක් බිහි කිරීමට දායක වී තිබේ. මෙය අද දවසේ අපි හමුවේ ඇති කටුක සහ විපරිත සත්‍යයි. 

Sunday, August 7, 2011

Sweat, Blood and Tears of ‘Traitors’

By an Anonymous Contributor,

It has been two weeks since our TUA was called off, and in the past couple of weeks I have been reading several blog posts and emails presenting two views about the conclusion of the union action and its success (or lack of it). One group is of the opinion that the union action was called off at an inappropriate moment, with some accusing the FUTA leadership and the negotiation team of treacherously betraying the struggle. The other group is of the opinion that FUTA accomplished many praiseworthy achievements and that continuation of the action might have undermined all that had been won so far. I belong to the latter group. However, the purpose of this piece of writing is not to justify the actions of the FUTA leaders and the negotiation team. Prof. Jayatissa of Ruhuna University (among others) has already done a great job in that respect.



The purpose of this letter is to put on record the sweat, blood and tears of some of these ‘traitors.’ I am not an office bearer of FUTA or our own trade union. However, I am a close friend and colleague of two FUTA officials, one of whom was member of the negotiation team. I had the opportunity of observing from very close quarters their actions and experiences. Therefore, I feel it is my duty to let the finger pointers know how much these traitors were committed to the struggle and the price they paid for its success. I will not name my friends because I believe the stories of other FUTA leaders and negotiation team members are probably very similar. Let this be a tribute to all of them.



Sweat they did, by the bucketful. Since May 9th, when we began our TUA, until the very end my two friends could not attend to any of their academic or personal work. They were involved with the TUA on a 24x7 basis. Once when I called one of them at home around 9 p.m., his wife told me she was waiting for him to come home from a meeting to take their son to a doctor. Later I learnt it had been after 11 p.m. when they managed to visit a nursing home and get some medicine their son. During office hours, whenever I dropped into the office of one or the other of my friends, I hardly got a chance to speak to him/her for five minutes at a stretch. Because, s/he would have to answer or make a phone call or write an email: to discuss strategy, to coordinate with the sister unions, to organise a press conference, to verify the truth of various rumours that were floating about; the list goes on. (By the way, did anyone think of the personal phone bills of these people?) Of course, these interruptions to our conversations occurred when I managed to actually get into their offices, provided that they were not away at some meeting or another. Often, even if s/he was in the room, I had to stand in line; in addition to all the work, my friends also had to explain the latest situation to the umpteenth colleague who wanted the news straight from the horse’s mouth. This is just a fraction of the visible aspects of their toil. There was also the tremendous mental stress. Once, on hearing about a negotiation session and an ‘after-session’ discussion that had started in the afternoon and had gone well past midnight, I commented that it must have been exhausting. My friend gave me a tired smile and said that it didn’t end there. He explained how the moves, counter moves, disparate opinions of sister unions, possible moves of the opposition three or four steps down the negotiation process, newspaper reports, solid information, half-rumours, public opinion and a thousand other variables in the negotiation equation  were constantly playing in his mind, day and night. In summary, their entire life was consumed by the TUA during that period.



I do not mean to imply that they were the only ones who worked hard. I attended two of the public meetings organised by our sister unions and I was impressed by the hard work they had put into organising them, and also by the efforts of those who had travelled from one end of the country to the other to participate. I was also told by my two friends how some sister unions were involved in collating relevant information which they provided to the FUTA leadership, and various other services rendered by different sister unions. I do not wish to undermine any of that effort. However, I do believe FUTA leaders and the negotiation team had to work the hardest; simply because there was a set of tasks they had to do. No one else could do them.



Their blood was drawn too. Both my friends were victimised by administration because they were two of the most visible members of the struggle. The name of one of them was also dragged in mud and vilified in a vicious web post aimed at destroying the TUA (not written by a university teacher). I hope he never saw it. No one deserves to be subjected to such ugliness. Once again, I am not saying that it was only the FUTA leaders or the negotiation team who got victimised or slandered this way. However, being the most visible parties, they were more vulnerable and direct targets. I should also mention that as far as my two friends are concerned, before the TUA neither of them had earned any adverse comments from the administration or anyone else for unprofessional conduct or poor performance. What they have earned now is a direct result of being at the forefront of the struggle. It is ironic that they have also earned the title of ‘traitor’ from within our own ranks. A traitor betrays a cause for personal benefit, but all my friends have personally gained is what is likely to be a huge impediment on their career path.



They did not shed tears because they are made of sterner stuff, but that is not for want of instances that merited tears. I saw the fatigue and stress on their faces caused by endless demands on their time and effort for a hundred and one tasks that absolutely needed to be done. I saw the frustration and, at times, despair in their eyes after some of the early negotiations ended up without result. (Yes, in case we have now forgotten, a number of the initial negotiation sessions ended in deadlock. Nothing was offered to us on a platter.) I saw their hurt when superiors of the institution they consider a second home condemned and punished them for their role in the struggle without a second thought. Yet, they didn’t give up. They kept at it for nearly three months until much was achieved. And now, I see the sadness in their eyes when the very same people on whose behalf they toiled are pointing accusatory fingers, crying “treachery!”



Did they fail? Did they call off the TUA at the wrong time? As I noted earlier, I believe they did the right thing at the right time. However, that is my opinion; there is room for the other opinion too. Let us assume that they failed in the task (keeping in mind that it is only one opinion). Then it is a question of competence. From what I saw, and made a poor attempt at describing here, any failure is not due to of lack of effort. If the appointed team has been incompetent in their task, it is up to a new, more competent team to learn from their mistakes and take the struggle forward in the proper way. That is for the membership of the sister unions to decide. With regard to the TUA just concluded, I have a few questions for you: If the problem (assuming there was a problem) was one of ability of the FUTA leadership and the negotiation team, does it negate all the hard work they put in? Does it negate their sincerity? Did their conduct warrant the title of ‘traitor’?

අරගලය පාවාදුන්නා කියන්නේ තොරතුරු දන්නෙ නැති අය

රාවය 07/08/2011
ආචාර්ය ප්‍රභාත් ජයසිංහ, විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සමිති සම්මේලනයේ උප ලේකම්
 
ප්‍රසාද් නිරෝෂ බණ්ඩාර [Sunday, August 7, 2011]

විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්ය වරුන්ගේ වෘත්තීය අරගලය පළාත් පාලන ඡන්දයට දින දෙකකට කලින් හදිසියේ නැවැත්වීම සැක සහිත බවත්, ජයග්‍රාහී ලෙස අවසන් කළ හැකිව තිබූ අරගලය මේ අයුරින් හොර රහසේ අවසන් කිරීම අදහාගත නොහැකි බවත් බොහෝ ආචාර්යවරු අදහස් පළ කළා? 

මේක ඒ වෙලාවෙ නවත්වනවාද නැද්ද කියල මම දැනගෙන හිටියෙ නෑ. අපි මේක නවත්වන්න තීරණය කළේ අවශ්‍ය ලියකියවිලි ඔක්කොම අපිට ලැබුණට පස්සේ. මේ අරගලය නවත්වන දවසේ උදේ අපි කාටවත් කියන්න පුළුවන් කමක් තිබුණෙ නෑ අපි මේක නවත්වනවා කියලා. හවස විධායක සභාව රැස්වෙලා එතනින් තීරණය අරගෙන තමයි අපි මේක නැවැත්තුවෙ. 

මෙම එකඟතාවට දිනකට පෙර විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සමිති සම්මේලනයේ මාධ්‍ය ප්‍රකාශකවරයා කියන්නේ අදාළ යෝජනාවලිය කිසිදු වටිනාකමක් නැති එකක් බවයි?

ඒක එතුමාගේ පෞද්ගලික කරුණක්. මාධ්‍ය ප්‍රකාශකවරයෙක් කියන්න ඕනෙ සංගමය හදල දීපු දේවල්. නමුත් අපි එහෙම දෙයක් හදල දීලා නෑ. මේ යෝජනාවලිය වැඩකට නැති එකක් කියලා කියන කරුණ පිළිගන්න පුළුවන් එකක් නෙමෙයි. මේ යෝජනාවලිය තුළ පිළිගන්න පුළුවන් දේවල් තියෙන නිසා තමයි අපි සංගමයක් විදියට ඒක පිළිගත්තේ. 

මේ අරගලය නැවැත්වීමට නම් තම ඉල්ලීම් ඒ අයුරින් ඉටුවිය යුතුයි යන සෘජු මතයක සිටි සහ රජය සෘජුව විවේචනය කළ විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සමිති සම්මේලනයේ ඇතැම් නිලධාරීන් තම සාකච්ඡාවලදී ක්‍රම ක්‍රමයෙන් ඉවත් කර රජයේ හිත දිනා ගැනීමට ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සංගමය (ත‍මඒ) උත්සාහ කළ බව චෝදනාවක් තියෙනවා? 

එහෙම කියන්න බෑ. අපි කිසිම සාකච්ඡාවකදී කිසි කෙනෙක් හිතා මතා මග ඇරලා නෑ. උදාහරණයක් විදිහට ජනාධිපතිවරයා හම්බවෙන්න අපි යනවා කියලා හිතමුකො. එතකොට ෆුටා එකේ ඉන්න හැමෝටම ඒකට යන්න බෑනෙ. ඒවගේ අවස්ථාවක යන්න වෙන්නෙ සීමිත පිරිසකට විතරයි. 

මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් විවේචන එල්ල කරන බොහෝ දෙනාගෙ අදහස තමයි, විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරුන්ගේ සමිති සම්මේලනය අරගලයේ අවසන් අදියර තුළ වෘත්තීය සමිතියක් ලෙස තමන්ම තීරණයක් නොගෙන රජය සමග කරන ගනුදෙනුවලදී රාජ්‍ය හිතවාදී වෙනත් ආචාර්යවරුන් කිහිප දෙනෙකු මත යැපුණු බව?

ත‍මඒ එක විදියට අපි තීන්දු තීරණ ගන්න වෙනම යාන්ත්‍රණයක් තිබුණා. විවිධ ගනුදෙනු සම්බන්ධයෙන් රජය පාර්ශ්වයන් එක්ක කවුරුහරි පිරිසක් සාකච්ඡා කරනවානම් ඒ යාන්ත්‍රණය තුළ සිදුවුණු දේ තමයි ඒ සාකච්ඡා කළ දේවල් පසුව විධායක සභාව ඉදිරියේ සාකච්ඡාවට බඳුන් කළ එක. ඒ සාකච්ඡාව තුළ තමයි අපි ගන්න තීන්දු තීරණ මොනවාද කියලා අවසන් වශයෙන් තීරණය කරන්නේ. ඕනෑම ගනුදෙනුවක් තුළ ඔබ කිව්වා වගේ අතරමැදියන් ඉන්න පුළුවන්නෙ. 

අපි මේ අරගලය මෙතනින් නවත්වනවා කියන තීරණය පවා විධායක සභාව තුළ තීරණය කරලා අන්තිමට එක එක විශ්වවිද්‍යාලවල නියෝජිතයන්ට කතා කරලා ඇහුවා. එතනදි විශ්වවිද්‍යාල තුනක් විතරයි කිව්වෙ මේක නවත්වන්න එපා මේ වෙලාවෙ කියලා. අනික් ඔක්කොම නියෝජිතයෝ මේ තීන්දු තීරණවලට එකඟ වුණා. 

මෙතනදි වැදගත් වෙන්නේ මේකට කවුද සම්බන්ධ වුණේ ඔවුන්ගෙ දේශපාලන සම්බන්ධතා මොකක්ද කියන එක නෙමෙයි. ඒ පිරිස දිවා රෑ මහන්සිවෙලා සමස්ත විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරුන් වෙනුවෙන් කොච්චර දුක් වින්දද, කොච්චර කැපවීමක් කළාද කියන එක. මේ අරගලය නවත්වද්දි ආචාර්යරුන්ගේ සංගමය ප්‍රකාශ කරන්නේ මේක තාවතාලිකව නවත්වනවා කියන එකනෙ? මොකක්ද මේ තාවකාලිකව නවත්වනවා කියන එක?

අපි මේ වැටුප් වැඩිකිරීම් ඉල්ලුවේ අධියර තුනකින්. ඒ අදියර තුන තමයි දැන් එකක් වැඩිකරන්න, ලබන අයවැයෙන් සහ ඊළඟ අයවැයෙන් ඉතුරු දෙක වැඩිකරන්න කියලා. තාවකාලිකව නවත්වනවා කියන එකේ තේරුම තමයි අපේ ඉල්ලීම් ඉෂ්ට නොවුණොත් මේ එන්න තියන අයවැයෙන් පස්සෙ අපි ආයෙත් අරගලයට යනවා කියන එක. 

නමුත් මේ විදියට වැටුප් වැඩි කරන බවට රජය පාර්ශ්වයෙන් මාර්ග සිතියමක් දෙන්නෙ නෑ නේද? 
ඒක හරි. අපි රජයෙන් ඉල්ලලා තිබුණා ඒවගේ ලිඛිත මාර්ග සිතියමක්. නමුත් ඇත්ත කරුණ, රජයක් එහෙම දෙන්නෙ නෑනෙ, ඊළඟ අයවැය ගැනවත් තව අවුරුදු ගණනකට පස්සෙ එන අයවැයක් ගැනවත් ලිඛිත පොරොන්දු අදම. 

ඒ නිසා තමයි අපි කිව්වේ අපිට කමිටුවක් දෙන්න කියලා මේ ගැන හොයා බලන්න. ඒ කමිටුවට ත‍මඒ එකේ නිලධාරීන් සහ රජයේ නිලධාරීන් කිහිප දෙනෙක් අයිති වෙනවා. එතකොට මේ ගැන බලන්නේ ඒ අය. 

මේක තාවකාලිකව නැවැත්තුවා කියන තැන ඉඳන් බැලුවොත්, අපොස උසස්පෙළ විභාගය, විශ්වවිද්‍යාලවලට නවකයන් බඳවා ගැනීම වැනි අරගලයේ මූලික ආයුධ විශ්වවිද්‍යාල ආචාර්යවරයාගෙන් අහිමිවුණු කාලයක මහජන සහයෝගය ඇතිව නැවතත් මේ අරගලය පටන්ගන්න පුළුවන් වෙයි කියල හිතනවාද? 

ඒක කාර් එකක් ස්ටාර්ට් කරනවා වගේ වැඩක් නෙමෙයි. ඒක ඒ ඒ තත්ත්වය යටතේ බලන්න ඕන. මම හිතනවා අපි එකඟ වෙලා තියෙන විදිහට අපේ ඉල්ලීම් ලැබෙයි කියලා. එහෙම නැත්නම් අපිට තිබුණ වගේම අරගලයක් අරඹන්න පුළුවන් කියලා තමයි මගේ විශ්වාසය. අපි කරලා තිබුණ සාකච්ඡා එක්ක අපිට තිබුණේ පරීක‍ෂණ දීමනාවට කොන්දේසි ඇතුල් කිරීම කියන කාරණය විතරයි රජයත් එක්ක විසඳගන්න. මොකද වැටුප් වැඩිකිරීමේ චක්‍රලේඛය ඒ වෙනකොට අපිට ලැබිලා තිබුණා. අංශාධිපතිවරුන් ඉල්ලා අස්වීම වළක්වන්න 956 චක්‍රලේඛයත් ඒ වෙනකොට අහෝසි කරලයි තිබුණේ. ඉතින් එහෙම තියෙද්දි පර්යේෂණ දීමනාව කියන කරුණ විතරක් අරගෙන අපි ඉස්සරහට යන්න ඕනෙද? 

සමහරු කියනවා වගේ ඡන්දෙට දවස් දෙකකට කළිං මේක නවතිනවා. මං අහන්නේ ඡන්දෙට ඉස්සෙල්ලා නැවැත්තුවාම අපි පරාද වෙනවාද? ඡන්දයට ඉස්සෙල්ලා නවත්වපු එක ප්‍රශ්නයක්ද කියලා. ඒ වෙලේ අපි සලකා බැලුවේ ඡන්දෙන් පස්සේ වෙනකම් මේ අරගලය ගෙනිච්චොත් මීට වඩා ලැබෙනවාද සහ ඡන්දය දිනන ආණ්ඩුවක කේවල් කිරීමේ බලය ඡන්දයට කලින්ට වඩා ඡන්දයට පස්සෙ අඩුද වැඩිද කියලා. මේක ඡන්දෙන් පස්සේ වුණානම් ඒ දෙකම අපට අවාසි සහගත වෙන්න තිබුණා. 

උසස් පෙළ ප්‍රශ්නය අනිත් එක. උසස් පෙළ ප්‍රශ්නයත් එක්ක කේවල් කරන්නනම් අපි තව මාස එකහමාරක් මේ අරගලය ඇදගෙන යන්න වෙනවා. නමුත් එහෙම වුණොත් ජනතාව මොනව කියන්නේ? ජනමාධ්‍ය මොකද කියන්නේ? ශිෂ්‍යයන් මොකද කියන්නේ? 

අරගලයේ මූලික සටන්පාඨ අරගලය අවසන් වීමත් එක්ක තිබුණෙ නෑනෙ. අරගලයේ මූලික සටන් පාඨයක් වුණේ විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයෙන් ඉවත් වෙන දක‍ෂ ශිෂ්‍යයන් ආධුනික කථිකාචාර්යවරුන් විදිහට විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයට බඳවාගන්න බෑ. ඔවුන්ට ලැබෙන්නෙ ඉතා සුළු වැටුපක් නිසා ඔවුන් වෙනත් රැකියාවලට යනවා කියන එක. නමුත් නව වැටුප් ව්‍යුහය තුළ ආධුනික කථාකාචාර්යවරුන්ගේ වැටුප් වර්ධනයට ප්‍රමුඛත්වයක් ලැබිලා නෑ. එවන් තත්ත්වයක් තුළ මේ වගේ එකඟතාවට ඒම අරගලයේ මූලික අරමුණුත් එක්ක අපි තේරුම් ගන්න ඕන කොහොමද? 

අපි මේ වැටුප් වැඩිවීම ඉල්ලුවෙ මලික් ජෙෆ්රි කියන 2008 දී නිර්මාණය වුණු වාර්තාව අනුව. ඒ වාර්තාවෙ තියන එක දෙයක් තමයි ආධුනික කථීකාචාර්යවරුන්ගේ වැටුප් වර්ධනය මන්දගාමී වීම. උදාහරණයක් විදිහට ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ මහාචාර්යවරයෙකුගේ සහ ආචාර්යවරයෙකුගේ වැටුප ඊට අනුව වැඩිවෙන්න ඕනෙ සියයට 133 කින්. එහෙම නමුත් ආධුනික කථීකාචාර්යවරුන්ගේ විතරක් වැටුප් වැඩිවෙන්න ඕනෙ 65% කින්. අපි ඒ වාර්තාව මත ඉඳලා තමයි ගනුදෙනු ඔක්කොම කළේ. ඒක හරිද වරදිද කියන එක වෙනම කාරණයක්. 

මේ එකඟතාවන්වල කොතන හරි තියෙනවාද රජයේ සමස්ත වියදමින් 6%ක් අධ්‍යාපනය සඳහා වෙන් කළ යුතුයි කියන මූලික සටන් පාඨය වෙනුවෙන් ගත් කිසියම් හෝ කොන්දේසියක්? 
ඒක අපේ සටන්පාඨයක් තමයි. ඒක තවමත් අපේ සටන් පාඨයක්. අධ්‍යාපනය සඳහා රජයේ වියදමින් 6% ක් වැයකරනවා කියන එක රජය අවුරුද්දකින් කරන්නේ නෑනෙ. එම වියදම 6%ක් වැඩිකරනකම් අපි රැකියාවලට නොගිහින් ඉන්න එක යථාර්ථවාදීත් නෑනෙ. අපි කියන්නේ 2015 විතර වෙද්දි මේ ගාන වැඩිවෙන් ඕන කියලා. 

මේ දේවල් විවේචනය කරන අය බලන්න ඕනෙ කොයි වගේ ප්‍රති මල්ලවයෙක්ට විරුද්ධවද අපි මේ තීරණය ගන්නේ කියලා. තමන්ගේ ඔළුවට උඩින් කාක්කෙක්වත් යන්න බෑ කියන නායකයෙක් ඉන්න රටක අපි මේ අරගලය පටන්ගද්දි බොහෝ අය කිව්වේ ඔයාලට සත පහක්වත් ගන්න බෑ කියලා. ඒවගේ තත්ත්වයක් තුළ අපි මේ ලබාගත්ත දේ සතුටුවෙන්න කාරණාවක්. මේක පාවාදුන්නු බව කියන අය කියන්නේ මේ වෙනකොට අපි සිටි තත්ත්වය දන්නේ නැතිව. මීට වඩා ජයග්‍රාහී ලෙස මේ අරගලය අවසන් කරන්න තිබුණා කියන අයගෙන් මං අහන්නේ එක ප්‍රශ්නයයි. ඒ තමයි මොකක්ද මීට වඩා ජයග්‍රාහී තැන කියලා.

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Dons to make decision following court ruling

Dailymirror 03/08/2011

The voluntary administrative positions of University teachers would depend on the outcome of the case in the Appeal Courts today, sources said.

FUTA President Dr. Ranjith Nirmal Dewasiri speaking to Daily Mirror today stated that since the case in Appeal Courts and the prevalent issue between the academics and Vice Chancellors were linked, they would most likely take a decision concerning the situation following the outcome of the court case. 

During early June, the Court of Appeals issued an interim order to the Department Heads in the Wayamba, Sri Jayawardenapura and Ruhunu universities, restraining them from accepting the resignations rendered by academics during end of May. 

The interim orders were issued following the hearing of three writ applications filed by students in the three universities. 

“We are attempting to come up with a practical solution to the current situation since we believe there is no need to further delay the restoration of normalcy in universities,” Dr. Dewasiri said adding that there were several urgent activities that needed to be carried out including the release of results for the final year students and resuming examinations that were disrupted due to the trade union actions. 

“The VCs are still not ready to accept the resignations rendered by the academics in May. Our position concerning the current situation hasn’t changed - we are expecting the VCs to issue fresh appointment letters to the resigned academics. However we hope that we will be able to work up a permanent solution to the situation in an official level soon,” he added.  

Speaking further he said that although they haven’t arrived at an agreement with the VCs yet, certain practical arrangements have been made in certain universities informally to resume activities.

The university academics resigned from their voluntary administrative positions on May 3 as part of a series of trade union actions to urge the government to grant them an adequate salary increase. (By Lakna Paranamanna)

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Student fallen sick during ‘leadership training’ dies

Lanka Truth, 02/08/2011,

A female student, who fell sick during the ‘leadership training’ for university students, has died in Badulla Hospital.
Nishanthi Madhushani, who had been undergoing leadership training’ at Diyathalawa Army camp had fallen ill on 29th June and was admitted to Badulla Hospital. Later, she had been admitted to the intensive care unit.
The inquest report indicates the cause of death was a germ entering her lungs as a result of staying in an environment full of dust.
Nishanthi, the youngest of a family of three in Tennekonewela area in Welimada was 24 years old at the time of her death.

Expanding Horizons – English Education and Politics in the Nineties Moving to Sri Jayewardenepura

The Island 18/07/2011

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

I joined the University of Sri Jayewardenepura in October 1992, as a senior lecturer in the Department of Languages. English was taught at USJP only as one component of a General Degree, ie students did only one third of their papers in the subject, two a year I believe it was in those days, out of six altogether.

All students in all Faculties were also supposed to do General English, which was looked after by the English Language Teaching Unit. Nominally under the Department of Languages, it functioned under its own head, who was generally one of the senior members of the Unit. These were almost all women, who were constantly bitching against each other though they tended to unite against any outsider.

When I was appointed, with a brief it was indicated to tighten up English teaching by the ELTU too, its then head, Damayanthi Ahangama, promptly resigned. There was a move then to appoint the lady who was in fact the best qualified of the lot, Oranee Jansz, but if there was one thing that could bring the other older ladies together apart from an outsider, it was Oranee. After various kerfuffles, Damayanthi agreed to resume the post. She was in fact quite able, but the lowest common denominator approach of the Unit had led to her not really using her talents.

I found however that, of the various books written by USJP staff for the proposed English course at the Affiliated University Colleges – which had been the main reason I had joined USJP, which was in charge of these – Damayanthi’s was the best. With some revision we brought it out very soon and prescribed it at USJP too, which made her happy though some of the other ladies were not pleased. I think she herself was surprised that she alone was credited for the book, and it made her realize I was not out to do down the ELTU.

Why the others disliked Oranee so much became clear after I had consulted the various Faculties of the University. Almost all the Deans, and several heads of Department who also spoke to me, requested that Oranee be allocated for their students. Such universal appreciation had naturally, for Sri Lanka and for academic communities in general, drawn the dispprobation of her peers.

That appreciation also helped me to put up with Oranee’s initial hostility towards me. A trade unionist of conviction, she felt she had to lead the opposition to me as an outsider trying to usurp the powers of the ELTU. Unlike some of her peers, she was quite direct, but fortunately, having been told of her capabilities and her commitment, I refrained from arguing, and made it clear that I appreciated her work. In time we became very good friends, and collaborated with great pleasure on the General English Language Training (as we renamed it) GELT course for pre-University students islandwide. We also produced several textbooks together, and she became a mainstay of the training programme I tried to put in place when English medum was reintroduced in secondary schools.

By then however I had left USJP, so I was not there when she was finally made head of the ELTU. I do not think however that she was able to institute the reforms she wanted to, given the existing work ethic there. I believe she achieved much more in the earlier period which began the year I joined, for she had been asked to take charge of English for the new Medical Faculty that USJP had set up. The exciting interactive course she devised did much I think to make the rural students who formed the bulk of the USP intake willing and able to use English, and I think it is a tribute to her, as much as to the dynamic staff who began the Faculty, that USJP doctors were soon on a par with those from other universities.

I did what I could to improve the curriculum the ELTU was using, and I think the books they themselves had produced for the AUC course helped. My other effort, to streamline the way classes were run in the Arts Faculty, failed miserably. The timetable was complicated enough, since Arts students could take any combination they wanted, but my schedule of classes for those who would be free at any particular time was not understood at all, given the total inability to concentrate and think that the rag imposed on new students. I realized then that ragging was political in intent, in addition to its release of primal instincts in youngsters to whose head all this power went. By reducing the freshers to blind obedience, their ability to make decisions on their own was crushed.

All this however became clear only several months later, since the beginning of term, which had been scheduled for January, was postponed because of the inevitable strike. I had more time then to get things ready, and in particular to build up a team for the Literature course too. The University obligingly advertised, and I was able to get the person I wanted most, Paru Nagasunderam from what had been the Higher Institute of English Education at the NIE. That had been downgraded and, with succession struggles there, she had fallen prey to the rivalries endemic in such a place. It seemed the work she had done for the training courses I had organized while at the British Council had contributed to the jealousy.

I was horrified to find that, when she was appointed to USLP, one of the dominant figures in the ELTU made free with appalling racist observations. It turned out that Paru was the first Tamil, or so it was claimed, to have been taken onto the academic staff at USJP, and this was deeply resented, with an attempt to claim that she must be a Tiger. With that sort of racism I could understand why Tamils could become bitter, but fortunately most of the ELTU were more decent, and Oranee in particular was magnificient, both in denouncing racism, and in taking Paru under her wing. I should note however that the hope the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean had initially entertained, of making her Head of the ELTU, was thus permanently stymied.

The Vice-Chancellor was Mr Dorakumbura, whom I had known most recently as the Director of the Anuradhapura Affiliated University College. He had been Librarian at USJP, and an SLFP stalwart, which is why I had first come across him. An old supporter of Mrs Bandaranaike, he had been on the Board of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, which had selected me for a post in 1981, only to be stopped by J R Jayewardene’s machinations with the BMICH Act.

I had got on very well with Mr Dorakumbura while he was at Anuradhapura. The previous USJP Vice-Chancellor had made the appointment and then, impressed by Dorakumbura’s commitment to AUCs, had enthusiastically pushed for his appointment as the new VC at USJP when he himself was made Ambassador to France. This had led to some opposition within the university, and Dorakumbura’s appointment had been challenged, which led to some bad blood when finally it went through.

Saddest of all I think was the hostility that developed between him and the new Dean of the Arts Faculty. Prof Palihawadana, who had been the Dean with whom I had worked on the AUCs, told me that Prof Wilson was probably the best person to succeed him, and so it proved. A man of great intelligence, integrity and ability, an unusual combination in our university system, he was open to new ideas and initiatives. We got on extremely well, but before long he had resigned, because of differences of opinion with the Vice-Chancellor, and this led to immense problems for the plans we had had for English.

ULU’s dilemma - to lecture or not to

LakbimaNews, 31/07/2011,


Ministry of Higher Education reneges on agreement


By Sanjaya Nallaperuma

Though the University Lecturers Union (ULU) decided to call off their strike which had gone on for some months reports now emerge that there is a possibility that the lecturers will be forced to resort strike once again since the Ministry of Higher Education has not shown any interest in solving issues pertaining to their salary anomalies.   13-1
The strike by the university lecturers crippled the country’s higher education sector for a number of months. It is also reported that certain lecturers are not pleased with the ULU for having called off their strike. 

Conditions
Among the conditions put forward by the ULU at the time they called off the strike was the reinstating of lecturers who had voluntarily resigned from their posts. However, university vice chancellors have said that such lecturers could only be reinstated if they withdraw their letters of resignation. This turn of events has prompted the ULU to seriously consider re-launching their strike and that is bound to cripple the university sector once more. 
“When we called off the strike, we specifically imposed the condition that lecturers who had voluntarily resigned from their posts should be re-instated. We only asked for the section heads to be given fresh appointments. But the vice chancellors insist that until lecturers withdraw their resignations those new posts cannot be given. We obtained legal advice in this regard, and were told that these resignations cannot be withdrawn. If they were to withdraw their letters of resignation as requested by the vice chancellors it will be detrimental to us as a trade union. This is why we are reluctant to withdraw letters of resignation,” said the ULU president, Dr. Nirmal Ranjith Devasiri. 
He said that a similar incident had taken place in 1996, and added that vice chancellors of universities have no right to contravene rules and regulations to seek petty gains.
However, the Ministry of Higher Education states that such resignations cannot be deemed as valid as they had not exceeded three months. 
Secretary of the Ministry of Higher Education, Dr. Sunil Jayantha Navarathna said that the ULU should withdraw such resignations. But ULU chief Dr. Nirmal Devasiri alleged that it had been the government that had issued a circular to the effect that such resignations should be forwarded three months prior to     effective date -- and charged that the government is now changing its stance on its whims and fancies.

Higher education in jeopardy


Meanwhile it has now come to light that as a consequence of these issues and the manner in which they are being highlighted, the education system within the university structure is in jeopardy. Dr. Nirmal Devasiri warned that trying to overlook the issues and not addressing the concerns of the lecturers would impact negatively on students seeking higher education. 
Dr. Devasiri charged that several universities in Sri Lanka are currently in a dilemma as lecturers are still reluctant to commence lectures, as there is no assurance that their grievances have been fully addressed. He said that the current situation has directly led to education in universities plunging to abysmal depths. 
The ULU president also said that some members of their union have begun to question them on their decision to call off the strike. He said that being critical of decisions that they take on behalf of the union would not be a healthy move as it would go against any future steps they may take on behalf of the ULU. He was however quick to add that they will continue to fight for their just demands if the need arises. 
He also charged that some are being driven by political interests and are tying to divide the ULU. As they were not successful in their effort to hamper the trade union action they are now trying to divide the ULU, he added.

Expanding Horizons – English Education and Politics in the Nineties – II The new Englishes at Sri Jayawardenepura

The Island 01/08/2011

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

The English course at USJP was not the main reason I had joined the place, though ultimately what I achieved there also I think had a long-lasting impact. I started an External Degree which had three components, all in English medium, and this has now become I believe the most popular External Degree course in the whole university system. Whereas what might be termed the senior universities had prided themselves on their esoteric English courses, focused mainly on English Literature, with a dash of even more esoteric Linguistics, my course also had a language component. This encouraged English teachers, and aspiring ones around the country, who knew that what they and school students needed most was language improvement, to follow this degree course in droves.

Initially the third component of the degree had been Western Classics, in part because I thought a knowledge of classical literature as well as history would assist students to a better understanding of English literature too. The argument was based on custom too, in that Western Classics was also on offer in the Kelaniya internal and external degrees. It was seen as a comfortable option both by Colombo students who had studied the subject at Advanced Level, and by teachers who were able to do the subject in English, given that this was not possible with many other subjects.

In time however I realized that this was not really useful and, when I was at the Ministry of Education in 2001 to restart English medium in schools, I asked USJP, where Paru Nagasunderam was by then Head of the recently established Department of English, to introduce English Language Teaching as a subject for the external degree. She obliged at once, which has made that degree, comprised of English Language, English Literature and English Language Teaching, immensely popular. The only drawback is that there are so many papers to mark that results are often delayed. Needless to say, none of the other universities responded then to my request to introduced ELT into their courses, though perhaps the situation is better now in this regard.

I had also introduced English Language as an option into the internal degree programme, and most of the students in that first year opted for both Literature and Language. There were a number of Buddhist monks amongst them, and they proved deeply committed. I wondered that so many bright young men had opted for the monkhood but there was a close causal connection: for bright boys in peasant communities, entering a temple was often the only way in which they could continue with their education, since there were so many pressures otherwise to drop out and enter the world of work early.

Not quite understanding the system, I had assumed that we had to teach twice as many periods for each paper as was in fact the case. Since we also taught each paper twice, since that was the only way to accommodate students doing a whole range of combinations, Paru and I and the two young ladies we had taken onto the staff worked excessive hours in that first year, but the enthusiasm and rapid improvement of our students made the whole business fully worthwhile.

My own teaching load, about twelve hours a week, had to be crammed into just a couple of days, because I was also busy with the AUCs, which had after all been my main reason for joining USJP. There were three of these doing English to start with, at Anuradhapura and Belihuloya and Rahangala near Bandarawela, but two more started in the following year, at Buttala and at Trincomalee. The first three and Buttala came under USJP, but the Trincomalee AUC was under the Eastern University.

When the AUCs were set up, great care had been taken to appoint their Directors, and I was very impressed with the quality of those I met. Dorakumbura had started Anuradhapura, and Belihuloya had an Economics Lecturer from USJP called Somasundara who seemed much quieter, but was extremely efficient. Rahangala had an outsider as its Head, a local monk who was dynamic as well as capable, and clearly a much admired character in the area. When Buttala started, it had Prof Bamunuarachchi from USJP, while Trincomalee had a Drector of Education called Siron Rajaratnam, who turned out to be the brightest and most devoted of the whole lot.

Getting lecturers was a problem from the start. We were almost in despair after the first set of interviews, for we found only one competent person for each of the first three AUCs. Janaki Moonsinghe at Anuradhapura turned out the mainstay of the programme there, but there were problems in the other two places with the persons we selected. Gamini Fonseka, whom David Woolger had recommended as a colleague of his at the Pasdunrata College of Education, went off almost immediately to Norway, so we had to start Rahangala with no proper permanent staff. And at Belihuloya, Panini Edirisinghe fell foul of Somasundara, and was unceremoniously sacked on the day the AUC officially opened.

His dismissal was patently unfair, based on fraudulent documents that included a host of pre-dated letters warning him formally, but on that very day Somasundara’s wife fell ill, terminally as it turned out, and the matter could not be pursued. I also had some sympathy for Somasundara, for the animosity was based in part on Panini’s barely disguised contempt for someone for whom English was not a first language. Like many of those from a privileged background, very conscious of having schooled at S. Thomas’, Panini thought there was something wrong with those who did not speak English correctly, and he had conveyed as much to colleagues at other universities. I was horrified, for instance, when a lecturer at Colombo, which was in any case not in favour of the AUC attempt to give English qualifications to those without Advanced Level English, expressed surprise at the effrontery of an institution planning to teach English when its Director did not know English.

This was utterly unfair on Somasundara, who could actually express himself very competently, even if it was clear this was not a familiar tongue. But it was that type of attitude in the old universities that made me defensive about him, and not take seriously Panini’s other point, that much money had been wasted, perhaps not entirely honestly, in the equipping of the University College. The library for instance had been packed with multiple copies of readers for children, which was certainly inappropriate –and that was a practice that continued over the years, culminating in the buying of fascicles at about Rs 10,000 each, on subjects that were not of the slightest interest to anyone.

But the discovery of all this, and the corruption that is endemic in the university system, given the ease with which accountability is avoided, lay in the future. In 1992, embarking on my work officially now with the AUCs, delighted with a programme that would at last make English more widely available at the level that could best ensure a cascade effect, I was nothing but enthusiastic about the new Affiliated University Colleges.